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It appears that if the beneficiary waits until the end of the sevenyear period and then brings an action on the insurance policy, he
will receive favorable treatment. Upon the presentation of some
evidence to indicate that the insured died either upon his disappearance or shortly thereafter, the court may allow the jury to determine
the time of death.
Most juries that decide the question find that the insured died
while covered by life insurance.21 The Florida Court, since it has not
taken a position on the matter, could adopt a presumption that death
occurred at or near the time of disappearance. It could also adopt
the view expressed in the "Tisdale Doctrine." Either rule would
avoid many of the hardships created by the other doctrines. 22 By
establishing one of these more liberal views, the Court would allow
the intent of the insured to be realized. The financial security he
intended for his dependents would be achieved without the contingency of total loss resulting from lack of evidence as to the exact
time of death.
An indirect result of either view would be a greater willingness
on the part of insurance companies to settle claims. If, after investigation, the company is in doubt as to whether the insured is dead, it
can protect itself by requiring a bond before allowing the beneficiary
to receive the proceeds.
FRANK C. LoGAN

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND THE HOLLAND CASE

-

It has long been settled that a criminal conviction can be based
entirely on circumstantial evidence.1 Many courts, however, view
circumstantial evidence as less reliable than testimonial or direct evidence. In these courts, a finding that the defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt as a matter of fact and law is not sufficient to
sustain conviction when the Government's case is based entirely on
circumstantial evidence. 2 An additional ruling must be made by
21. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, supra note 19; Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Meade, 281 Ky. 36, 134 S.W2d 960 (1939); Fanning v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y, 264 Pa. 333, 107 At. 715 (1919).
22. See notes 1, 10 supra.
1. E.g., United States v. Brecher, 242 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v.
Brown, 236 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1956); Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.

1954).
2. E.g., Cuthbert v. United States, 278 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1960); Curley v. United
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the judge that the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are not
only consistent with the defendant's guilt but also inconsistent with
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.3
This "special rule" in circumstantial evidence cases has long been
the subject of criticism. Its opponents contend that the relative value of
circumstantial and testimonial evidence cannot be compared in the
abstract, and that a fact can be proved equally well by either type,
4
provided allowances are made for the peculiar limitations of each.
To require a double standard in circumstantial evidence cases places
a burden on the prosecution to prove to the judge that there is no
reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt before the case can go to the
jury. Furthermore, the judge in a non-jury criminal trial would have
to rule as a matter of law that there is no reasonable hypothesis of
innocence before he could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Notwithstanding this criticism, the federal courts are divided
as to which standard should be applied in the use of circumstantial
evidence. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clings to the traditionally cautious approach and usually applies the double standard5 The
Second Circuit applies the opposite view, indicating that no distinction will be drawn solely because the evidence is circumstantial.
Should the burden of proof to be borne by the Government when
the case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence vary with the
circuit in which the crime was committed? Or, more precisely, should
the burden of proof vary from case to case in the same circuit? This
note will discuss this problem with particular emphasis on the Fifth
Circuit.
THE HOLLAND CASE

With the increasing utilization by federal prosecutors
worth" method of proving income in tax evasion cases,
a corresponding increase in the number of cases based on
tial evidence.7 As a result, the lack of uniformity among

of the "net
there came
circumstanthe circuits

States, 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Kassin v. United States, 87 F.2d 183 (5th
Cir. 1937).
3. Cuthbert v. United States, 278 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1960).
4. E.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); United States v. Becker,
62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929). See also I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §26 (3d
ed. 1940).
5. E.g., Cuthbert v. United States, 278 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1960); Panci v. United
States, 256 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1958);'Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1954). But see MacFarland v. United States, 273 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1960).
6. E.g., United States v. Tutino, 269 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v.
Moia, 251 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Becker, supra note 4; United
States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., supra note 4.
7. See.Note, 69 HARv. L. REV. 119, 154 (1954); 21 BROOKLYN L. REv. 297 (1954);

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol14/iss1/9

2

MacKay: Circumstantial
Evidence in the Federal Courts–The Fifth Circuit a
NOTES
in regard to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence necessary to
sustain conviction became critical. In 1954 the United States Supreme
Court, prompted by the divergent rulings of the lower courts, granted
certiorari in Holland v. United States.8 This was a net worth prosecution for income tax evasion in which the Government's case was
based on circumstantial evidence. The Court pointed out that it
was impossible as a practical matter for the Government to track down
every one of the defendant's explanations of possibly innocent sources
of unreported income. After the limits of practicality were reached,
either the "reasonableness" of the defendant's explanations would
have to be left to the jury, or else the net worth method of prosecution would have to be abandoned. The Court cautioned, however,
that leads should be tracked down that were reasonably susceptible of
being checked and that, if true, would establish the defendant's innocence. Referring to the necessity for special instructions to the jury
regarding circumstantial evidence, the Court stated: 9
"[Pletitioners assail the refusal of the trial judge to instruct
that where the Government's evidence is circumstantial it must
be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of
guilt. There is some support for this type instruction in the
lower courts . . . but the better rule is that where the jury is
properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such
an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect ......
Having thus dealt specifically with this aspect of the circumstantial
evidence controversy, the Court continued in more general terms:
"Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no
different from testimonial evidence. Admittedly, circumstantial
evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect result.
Yet this is equally true of testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence
correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy
or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities.
If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can
require no more."
In response to the mandate of the first quoted paragraph, the
federal courts have, since the Holland case, considered a special instruction regarding circumstantial evidence in criminal cases as ob35 B.U.L. RE:v. 313 (1954).
8. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
9. Id. at 139-40.
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solete. This was reflected by the Fifth Circuit in Perry v. United
States,10 a 1955 moonshine case, in which the court held that there
"was no need for such an instruction."
A conflict remains, however, in the interpretation of the second
quoted paragraph. Did the Supreme Court deal solely with jury
instructions or, as this paragraph seems to indicate, were the Court's
remarks directed toward the entire problem of the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence in criminal cases? The significance of this
question becomes apparent in the light of subsequent federal court
decisions, particularly those of the Fifth Circuit.
FIFTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS FROM

1955 THROUGH 1959

The sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction
arises as a question of law upon the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal and upon review of the case by an appellate court.
Pointing this out in Lloyd v. United States, a 1955 tax evasion case,
the Fifth Circuit Court made the following statement: 1
"It is not this Court's function to determine guilt or innocence. That judgment is exclusively for the jury, subject however to the decision of the district court reviewable by this Court
as to whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain conviction, a matter, of course, presenting a question of law. ...
In circumstantial evidence cases, this Court has said that the
test to be applied is whether the jury might reasonably find that
the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis except that of
guilt."
Three years later the same court, in Panci v. United States, 2 reversed a narcotics conviction based on circumstantial evidence. The
defendant had moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. The court again
3
stated its position:1
"[Tihis court has without wavering declared that the test to be
applied is whether the jury might reasonably find that the
evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of
guilt, and equally without wavering has applied it."
These statements show that although a jury in the Fifth Circuit

10.
11.
12.
13.

227 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1955).
226 F.2d 9, 13 (5th Cir. 1955).
256 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 312.
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is no longer given instructions to apply any special standard beyond
that of reasonable doubt in circumstantial evidence cases, the court,
in determining the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of law, must
apply a special standard when the Government's case is based on circumstantial evidence.
In non-jury trials, in which the judge acts as both judge of law
and trier of fact, the difficulty in applying two standards of sufficiency
to the same evidence is compounded. To justify a conviction, the
trial judge must decide that the evidence, as a matter of law, is inconsistent with every other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt.
He must decide also, as a matter of fact, that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. It will be seen that this can place both
the trial judge and the appellate court in a dilemma.
In De Luna v. United States,'4 a 1955 non-jury trial for violation
of the narcotics laws, the Government's case was based on circumstantial evidence. On appeal from a judgment of guilty, the circuit
court's opinion posed the following question as to the proper application of the separate rules of sufficiency of the evidence by the trial
judge in the absence of a jury:' 5
"In this case, was the evidence sufficient to justify the trial
judge, as a reasonable man, in concluding beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was not only consistent with defendant's guilt,
but was inconsistent with any reasonable theory of his innocence, and that the defendant was guilty?"
This test seems to combine the two standards, and it compels the
trial judge to apply both in his function as trier of fact. It thus
appears wholly inconsistent with the statement in the Holland case
that the jury, as trier of fact, should apply only the standard of reasonable doubt.
The trial judge in Rodriguez v. United States,' 6 another non-jury
case, was reversed for failure to apply the special rule as to circumstantial evidence on the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
The court disregarded the Holland statement that circumstantial
evidence is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence, say17
ing:
"[Blecause of the fact that it is circumstantial and that a grave
wrong may be done to an innocent man by reasoning from cir-

14. 228 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1955).

15. Id. at 116.
16. 232 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1956).

17. Id. at 821.
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cumstances not sufficiently cogent in themselves or as connected,
and particularly not sufficiently exclusive of every innocent hypothesis, the courts have been very sedulous to prevent an innocent man from being found guilty .... "
Prior to 1958 the one consistent thread in the Fifth Circuit decisions concerning the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence was that
the court "without wavering" applied the special test to determine
sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law. The Holland opinion,
when not ignored entirely, was limited in its application to the issue
of jury instructions. In 1958, however, the Fifth Circuit Court, in
Lambert v. United States,'8 "wavered" significantly from the special
rule, and in so doing set the stage for its later difficulties. The issue
before the court was the refusal of the district judge to grant judgment of acquittal in a circumstantial evidence case. Even though there
was no reference made to the Holland case, the court appears to have
adopted the Supreme Court's position in the following statement: 9
"On a motion for judgment of acquittal the test is whether,
taking the view most favorable to the Government, a reasonably-minded jury might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt."
1960 DECISIONS - THE MACFARLAND AND CUTHBERT CASES
Two recent cases indicate that the Lambert case was merely an

expression of one of the two points of view that exist within the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as to the use of a special sufficiency
standard for circumstantial evidence.
The first of these cases was MacFarlandv. United States,20 decided
January 17, 1960. The defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal
because of insufficient circumstantial evidence to convict had been
denied, even though the Government had been unable to produce
evidence wholly inconsistent with his possible innocence. The jury
had then convicted the defendant of possessing an unregistered distillery. In sustaining the conviction, the court held that inferences

18. 261 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1958).
.
19. Id. at 801. The court cited these cases as authority: Mortensen v. United
States, 322 U.S. 869, 374 (1944); Glasser v. United States, 815 U.S. 60, 80 (1942);
Lloyd v. United States, 226 F.2d 9, 13 (5th Cir. 1955); Vick v. United States, 216
F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1954).
20. 278 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1960).
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to be drawn from circumstantial evidence are a matter for the jury
to decide, and not subject to review on appeal. The court said that
"it is not the function of an appellate court to weigh the evidence
anew or to pass on the credibility of witnesses."21 The court also
stated that "it is not necessary that the evidence be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided the evidence
is substantial enough to establish a case from which the jury may infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."22 This statement, for which the
court cited Holland as authority, carries several implications as to
the status of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases. Based on this
decision, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence should be judged,
as a matter of law, by the same standards as testimonial evidence.
Judgment of acquittal should be granted by the judge only upon the
Government's failure to present substantial evidence from which a
jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. More important,
whether the evidence precludes any reasonable hypothesis but that
of guilt should be treated as a question of fact bearing upon whether
the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Since appellate
courts, in theory, cannot review questions of fact, the scope of review
in circumstantial evidence cases would be narrowed. Practically
speaking, the nature of the burden of proof on the state would be
changed, even though not necessarily made less rigorous on any given
facts.
Because of these far-reaching implications it is not surprising that
the proponents of the special rule in the Fifth Circuit took the first
available opportunity to assert its applicability more dogmatically
than ever. The opportunity presented itself in Cuthbert v. United
States,2 3 decided May 10, 1960. This was an appeal from a non-jury
trial, based on circumstantial evidence, which resulted in the conviction of three defendants for violation of the narcotics laws. One
defendant, caught red-handed, confessed but refused to implicate the
other two. The two defendants in question had records as narcotics
violators, were dose friends of the third defendant, had traveled with
him from Washington, D. C., to El Paso, Texas, immediately prior
to the narcotics purchase, and had loaned him the money for a plane
ticket so that he could transport the illegally purchased marijuana
from El Paso to Washington. Based on these circumstances and others
pointing to guilt, the district judge found all three defendants guilty.
Even though a hypothesis of innocence on the part of two of the defendants was not totally inconsistent with the circumstantial evidence
presented against them, the trial judge found as a matter of fact that
21. Id. at 418.
22. Ibid.
23. 278 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1960).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1961

7

FloridaOF
LawFLORIDA
Review, Vol.LAW
14, Iss.REVIEW
1 [1961], Art. 9
UNIVERSITY

96

they were guilty, stating that there was no doubt in his mind on the
question.
Reversing the district court because of insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the court of appeals stated
that the trial judge had failed to distinguish between his role as judge
of the law and his role as trier of the facts. This failure, said the
court, had led him to make a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt without first determining as a matter of law that the circumstances relied upon excluded every other reasonable hypothesis.
The court dealt summarily with the Holland opinion by stating
that it related solely to instructions to the jury. It is noteworthy that
the court quoted only the first of the two relevant paragraphs in the
Holland decision, ignoring the second paragraph entirely. The MacFarland decision was not ignored, however. In referring to it the
court said that "it is true that in one or two cases, including . . .
courts have arguendo and as dicta
MacFarland v. United States ....
undertaken to give the Holland opinion an entirely different and more
far reaching effect." 24 The court agreed with the MacFarlandopinion
in that "whether the evidence ... is circumstantial or direct, if it is
substantial enough to establish a case from which the jury may infer
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sufficient to take the case to the
jury."2 5 However, the statement in MacFarland that circumstantial
evidence could, as a matter of law, be sufficient to take the case to
the jury when it was not wholly inconsistent with every reasonable
hypothesis but that of guilt was flatly rejected. The Court con2
cluded: 6
"On the contrary, we are of the clear opinion that in a case
where the evidence relied upon to establish guilt is entirely
circumstantial, it is essential to a just decision by the district
judge that the evidence makes out a fact case for the decision
of the jury, that the court conclude, that the jury might
reasonably find not only that the evidence is consistent with a
finding of guilt but that it is not consistent with any other
reasonable conclusion. If this is not so, a verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, based wholly on circumstantial
evidence, though it keeps the promise of a fair trial to the
ear, breaks it to the hope."

24. Id. at 224.
25. Ibid.

26. Id. at 224-25.
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CONCLUSION

The Cuthbert case emphatically re-established the rule in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that circumstantial evidence that does
not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt is
not a sufficient basis for a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. In so doing it pointed up, but failed to answer, questions
raised in earlier cases.
When the trial judge acts as both judge of law and trier of fact,
he must decide the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence under two
standards that do not necessarily give the same result when applied
to the same facts. No problem arises so long as the judge finds the
evidence sufficient as a matter of law under the special standard and
also sufficient as a matter of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Attempts to deal with variations of the situations
presented in the Rodriguez and Cuthbert cases can result in conclusions more noteworthy for their legal technicality than for their logic.
If the trial judge, having seen the witnesses and heard the evidence
at first hand, is convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, does this not indicate that he believes that any hypothesis not
disproved by the circumstantial evidence is not "reasonable"? In
Cuthbert the appellate court reversed the trial judge because he did
not specifically state that he had applied the special rule as a matter
of law prior to finding the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Presumably the court of appeals would have affirmed the
trial judge if he had used the proper verbalistic ritual in making
his findings. These non-jury cases pinpoint the dilemma of the trial
judge under the dual standard. They are also significant in that they
indicate that in circumstantial evidence cases the prosecutor in the
Fifth Circuit must overcome a burden of proof heavier than "guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt" before his case can be considered by a
jury. Thus the rule in the Holland case, though useful to a Fifth
Circuit prosecutor in a net worth case, is probably small comfort otherwise. In this situation, the words of Judge Learned Hand, "to translate such an admonition into a rigid ritual is to forget the actual determinants of a verdict and to mistake shadows for reality," 27 are particularly appropriate.
In summary, it is apparent that a prosecuting attorney in the
Fifth Circuit cannot determine the burden of proof he must bear.
The totally different requirements of MacFarland and Cuthbert reflect the divergence of opinion existing among the federal circuits

27. United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 863 (1929).
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